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Abstract
The common law has never developed a cause of action for discrimination. Instead, the legislatures have
stepped in. This article explores not whether there should be a cause of action for discrimination at
common law, but whether our thinking about discrimination from a legal point of view would benefit from
drawing upon common law methodology. We can contrast two methodologies for the design and
development over time of legal norms: the top-down model of the comprehensive code designed to bring
to life a grand theory about the norms regulating human interaction, and the bottom-up model of case-bycase analysis aiming toward the development of a set of principles explaining and justifying individual
decisions. Each has its place, but the latter is perhaps better suited to creating and changing norms in the
discrimination law area. However, the abdication of responsibility by the common law has led to the
legislatures intervening in their typical top-down style. Lacking a grand theory, the resulting statutory rules
have something of the quality of arbitrary pigeonholes into which complainants must fit their fact
situation or fail. Three issues are examined, revealing the detrimental impact of the pigeonhole-like quality
that current codes have taken on over the course of their development. The first two concern the
difficulties encountered in determining which attributes come within the protection of the law through
being designated as prohibited grounds of discrimination; the last is a re-examination of whether
discrimination is confined to differential treatment motivated by prejudice or encompasses causing
adverse effects upon vulnerable groups and individuals. The article makes some first steps towards
showing how discrimination law could develop differently if we were to adopt something more like the
common law method of norm creation and change.
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OF PIGEONHOLES AND PRINCIPLES:
A RECONSIDERATION OF

DISCRIMINATION LAW©
BY DENISE G. R]tAUME"

The common law has never developed a cause of
action for discrimination. Instead, the legislatures have
stepped in. This article explores not whether there
should be a cause of action for discrimination at
common law, but whether our thinking about
discrimination from a legal point of view would benefit
from drawing upon common law methodology. We can
contrast two methodologies for the design and
development over time of legal norms: the top-down
model of the comprehensive code designed to bring to
life a grand theory about the norms regulating human
interaction, and the bottom-up model of case-by-case
analysis aiming toward the development of a set of
principles explaining and justifying individual decisions.
Each has its place, but the latter is perhaps better suited
to creating and changing norms in the discrimination law
area. However, the abdication of responsibility by the
common law has led to the legislatures intervening in
their typical top-down style. Lacking agrand theory, the
resulting statutory rules have something of the quality of
arbitrary pigeonholes into which complainants must fit
their fact situation or fail. Three issues are examined,
revealing the detrimental impact of the pigeonhole-like
quality that current codes have taken on over the course
of their development. The first two concern the
difficulties encountered in determiningwhich attributes
come within the protection of the law through being
designated as prohibited grounds of discrimination; the
last is a re-examination of whether discrimination is
confined to differential treatment motivated by
prejudice or encompasses causing adverse effects upon
vulnerable groups and individuals. The article makes
some first steps towards showing how discrimination law
could develop differently if we were to adopt something
more like the common law method of norm creation and
change.

Puisque la discrimination ne donne pas naissance
A une cause d'action en common law, il a fallu que les
Assembl6es I6gislatives s'interposent. Dans cet article,
s'interroge si notre faqon de voir Ia discrimination, d'un
point de vue juridique, pourrait b6n6ficier d'une
m6thodologie illumin6e par la common law. On peut
faire le contraste entre deux m6thodologies utilis6es
pour la conception et le d6veloppement des normes
juridiques: soit le module "du haut en bas" (top down)
du code d6taill6, conqu pour m~rir une th6orie globale
de normes qui prescrivent le comportement humain, et
le modle "ascendant" (bottom up) qui analyse les cas
avec le but d'6noncer des principes pouvant expliquer et
justifier des d6cisions particuli~res. Chaque module a sa
place, mais le deuxi~me module se pr&te peut-6tre
mieux h la cr6ation et Ala modification des normes dans
le domaine de Ia discrimination. Toutefois, l'abdication
de la responsabilitd par la common law a suscitd le
fonctionnement du modle du haut en has par les
Assembl6es 16gislatives. Faute d'une th~orie globale, les
r~gles l6gislatives ont reffet de cr6er des categories
arbitraires dans lesquelles les densandeurs et
demanderesses doivent classifier leur situation
individuelle ou prendre le risque d'6chouer. On
comprend 'impact pr6judiciable de ces categories qui
caract6risent les codes par le biais de trois questions
pos&es par l'auteure. Les deux premires questions se
rapportent i la difficult6 h d6terminer quels attributs
font I'objet de la protection de la loi en raison de leur
d6signation de motif de discrimination illicite.
Finalement, 'auteure se demande si la discrimination
est limit6e au traitement diff6rentiel motiv6 par le
pr6judice ou si la discrimination doit avoir des
cons6quences pr6judiciables sur les groupes et les
individus vuln6rables. Cet article fait les premiers pas
dans une rh6torique qui sugg~re que les lois en iatire
de discrimination pourraient se d6velopper de fagon tr~s
diff6rente si l'on utlisait une m6thodologie puis6e de [a
common law.
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III.

The common law has never developed a cause of action for
discrimination. Instead, legislatures have stepped in, initially to prohibit
discrimination through a quasi-criminal form of regulation, later to create
a civil remedy.' When the issue of a common law remedy was raised in
Bhadauria,2 the Supreme Court of Canada held that human rights
legislation occupied the field, thus obviating common-law development in
the area. To create a common-law right would simply be to duplicate the
mechanism put in place by the legislature. Most of the debate about the
wisdom of the decision in Bhadauriahas turned on the importance of the
benefits at the margin of having an additional remedial avenue. While this
debate is important and is likely to heat up again in light of the substantial
backlogs plaguing human rights dispute resolution, in this article I explore
not whether there should be a cause of action for discrimination at common
law, but whether our thinking about discrimination from a legal point of
view would benefit from drawing upon common-law methodology.
I begin by distinguishing two contrasting methodologies for the
design and development of legal norms over time. First, I discuss the topdown model of the comprehensive code designed to bring to life a grand
theory about the norms regulating human interaction. Second, I identify
the bottom-up model of case-by-case analysis aimed at the development,
informed by concrete experience, of a set of principles explaining and
justifying the individual decisions. I argue that each model has its place, but
that the latter is perhaps better suited to creating and changing norms in
the area of discrimination law. However, the abdication of responsibility by
the common-law courts-the chief practitioners of the art of bottom-up
law-making-led to the intervention of the legislatures in their typical topdown style. Unfortunately, the legislature's efforts to devise comprehensive
human rights codes have not been undertaken with the benefit of the kind
The legislative history is traced in W.S. Tarnopolsky & W.F. Pentney, Discriminationand the
Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 1994) 1.
2 Bhadauriav. Board of Governors of Seneca College, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181.
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of grand theory that is needed to sustain them. Lacking such a foundation,
the resulting statutory rules have something of the quality of arbitrary
pigeonholes into which complainants must fit their fact situations or fail.
In this article, I demonstrate the pigeonhole-like quality that
current codes have taken on over the course of their development, and
examine three issues that reveal the detrimental impact of this law-making
strategy. The first two of these issues concern the difficulties encountered
in determining which attributes come within the law's protection through
designation as prohibited grounds of discrimination. The third issue is a reexamination of a central aspect of the scope of discrimination-whether it
is confined to differential treatment motivated by prejudice or encompasses
causing adverse effects upon vulnerable groups and individuals.
Throughout this article, I attempt to show how discrimination law could
develop differently if we were to adopt something more like the commonlaw method of norm creation and change. Only first steps are possible
here-the common-law method is incrementalist, with fully developed
theories of liability developing only gradually as a result of many minds
thinking through many cases.
For the purposes of this exercise, I do not engage the debate about
whether adjudication in this area should remain under the auspices of
administrative tribunals, or whether it should be returned to the jurisdiction
of the common-law courts. There are arguments on both sides. I am more
concerned with how we think about discrimination as a legal problem,
whatever institution is charged with the formulation and adjudication of its
rules. As will be clear from what I have already said, this argument about
which is the best approach to norm making is directed at the central
substantive rules defining the rights and responsibilities that directly
regulate human relationships in this area, not the rules that govern other
more administrative functions of human rights commissions.
.

TWO MODELS OF LAW-MAKING

The two approaches to norm creation and interpretation contrasted
in this article are at two ends of a continuum, but often shade into one
another. Articulating the two extremes as models helps explicate the
attitude towards law-making that underlies each. Neither model is all good,
nor all bad; rather, different legal problems may lend themselves better to
the use of one rather than the other. Both approaches involve the creation
of general standards of conduct, the hallmark of law-making.3 Such
3 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 124. Hart contrasts
this notion of general standards with "particular directions given to each individual separately."
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standards can be drafted in terms of greater or lesser abstraction and
generality. Competing senses of the interplay between abstraction and
specificity divide the two models. The first model operates in a top-down
fashion, and is associated with the legislative approach to norm creation.
The second exemplifies a bottom-up methodology, and is based on the
common-law process. My analysis initially pries apart the abstract
methodology and the character of the institution employing it; I return
below to questions arising out of the adoption of a particular model by a
particular institution. The top-down model is Benthamite in character,
while the bottom-up model owes more to the Blackstonian tradition.4 My
objective is to isolate the methodology of norm creation associated with
each of these traditions in order to examine the usefulness of each in the
discrimination law context. As I deploy them, both models are highly
idealized. Each produces its own distinctive style of judging that flows from
its conception of norm creation.
In its ideal form, the top-down model conceptualizes the lawmaking enterprise as the task of stating a comprehensive system of detailed,
precise rules grounded in a sound moral theory and designed to cover every
situation to be regulated. The authoritative determination, in advance, of
the lawfulness of all behaviour is its ambition. The first step is to decide
which moral theory or value structure is to be adopted. Are we to subject
all matters to a utility calculus or reject trading off one person's well-being
against that of others? Shall we treat autonomy as more important or is
virtue? Do we take morality to be monistic or pluralistic? In light of the
answers to these and many more questions we can proceed to derive and
enact more specific rules to deal with such things as the collection of
government revenue, automobile accidents, human cloning, monopolistic
behaviour, et cetera. As Hart pointed out, in order to work, such a model
requires both determinacy of aims or values, and determinacy of fact: "If
the world in which we live were characterized only by a finite number of
features, and these together with all the modes in which they could combine
were known to us, then provision could be made in advance for every
possibility ...

..
" Combined

with the availability of a comprehensive and

4 For a full-length treatment of the tug-of-war between these two traditions
of legal thought, see
G.J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). In
identifying the models with these larger schools of thought, I do not mean to tackle the full debate
between these two schools. For present purposes, I remain aloof from the deeper theoretical debate
about the extent to which these two schools exemplify competing accounts of the law, or the
authoritative status of legal rules. Similarly, I do not consider whether the norms that come out of each
of these processes properly deserve to be called "rules." For a recent analysis of how rules, standards,
principles, and factors play different roles in legal reasoning, see R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and
Political Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 1.
Hart, supra note 3 at
128.

2002]

Of Pigeonholes and Principles

determinate theory of the principles governing human relations,
determinacy of fact would allow us to work out our normative responses to
all the possible fact situations and decide in advance how each ought to be
regulated. In such a world, the law-making enterprise would be a one-off
event in that all the laws could be stated in one authoritative document-no
gaps would exist and no change would ever be needed. On this model, the
law-making process may start with grand principles of morality, but the
lawmaker's task is ultimately to formulate a precise system of rules
regulating behaviour and describing the consequences of nonconformity
with the law. The complementary task of the adjudicator is simply to apply
the rules as they are written.
At the other end of the spectrum is what might best be described
as the bottom-up model of norm creation. This model holds that although
we may agree on and be deeply committed to certain abstract values or
principles, we cannot anticipate all the fact situations in which they may be
implicated, nor can we fully map out a comprehensive view of the concrete
consequences implicated by those values.6 We want our legal system to be
informed by principles of justice, liberty, and equality, but these are multifaceted concepts whose full meaning is contested. In such situations, it is
wise not to attempt a comprehensive theory issuing a precise network of
rules at the outset, but rather to let the implications of the abstract
principles be revealed incrementally through confronting fact situations on
a case-by-case basis.
The process ideally begins with the application of the abstract
principle to paradigm cases in which there is both widespread consensus
and firm conviction as to the right outcome. Reasons will be offered as to
why particular cases fall under the law's protection. Normally, decision
making in these paradigm cases will yield relatively precise rules that cover
the standard features of cases thought to be paradigmatic. Consideration
of a range of paradigm cases as they have emerged will provide us with an
opportunity to reformulate the abstract principle or value, allowing us to
become more precise over time about its contours. This reformulation may
well include within its purview cases that would not have been anticipated,
or if anticipated, would not have been considered within the scope of the
principle at the start of the process. This exercise may also recast some
cases that were originally thought to fall within the value as more properly
excluded by it. In other words, reformulation will make the original abstract
principle more determinate in ways that may expand or contract initial
judgments about its application. Our thinking radiates from there to take
6 Sunstein, supra note 4 c. 2. Sunstein characterizes these as situations of incompletely theorized
agreement.
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in situations that are closely analogous, each possible analogy serving to test
the scope of the principle as previously articulated. Decisions about
whether or not to include an analogous situation under the principle make
the scope of the principle still more determinate. Again, after some
experience of working through analogous situations, revised rules that
make sense of the types of cases dealt with so far will be able to be
formulated. The process continues indefinitely-taking stock of where the
extension by analogy has taken us so as to reformulate the principle anew,
and then starting again to consider further analogies as actual disputes
present themselves for resolution. Within this model, the process of norm
creation is an ongoing matter in which any case might be an opportunity for
extension by analogy or other reshaping of the principle. Mere rule
application is therefore not easily distinguished from changing or adapting
the rule to meet changing needs or understandings of the problems at
hand.7
Whether this approach permits a more expansive interpretation of
the legal rule at stake depends, of course, on how broadly or narrowly the
general principle that is offered as the explanation of past cases is framed.
If one were able to craft a general principle that fit all the existing
precedents, the outcome in a given case would be exactly the same as that
arrived at by a judge who treats the rulings in past cases as fixed
pigeonholes into which any new case must fit in order to succeed. However,
by moving to a higher level of abstraction to frame the relevant principle,
a judge may craft a standard that may not only exclude some of the
outcomes in past cases, but also extend beyond existing case law, thereby
creating room for the recognition of new types of fact situations as falling
within the reach of the law. This approach understands that the law needs
to adapt to new social conditions and changing social mores to
accommodate growth over time. As there is typically more than one general
principle available to rationalize an area of law, the locus of controversy
within such an approach is whether a particular judgment goes farther than
is legitimate. The more abstract the principle offered, the more room it
creates for growth or change in the law, but the more controversial the act
of norm creation involved. At the extreme, a judge who offers the general
principle "people ought to be good" to explain an area of case law would
Lord Atkin's approach in the landmark negligence case Donoghue v. Stephenson, [19321 A.C.
562 [hereinafter Donoghue] illustrates this dynamic approach to norm creation. Lord Atkin saw the
instances in which plaintiffs had been successful in the past as examples of "some general conception
of relations giving rise to a duty of care" and thought that there must be "some common element"
underlying the past cases. See ibid. at 580. He understood it to be the judge's role to articulate that
common element in order to generate a general principle uniting the case law and guiding future
decisions. For an exposition of the Blackstonian roots of this conception of the connection between
concrete cases and more general principles, see Postema, supra note 4 at 30-38.
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be giving otherjudges virtually unlimited discretion to expand the law as far
as any plausible conception of "good" would take them. This example
demonstrates the latent legitimacy dilemma with the bottom-up method.
Adaptation to change keeps the law supple, yet the more creative a new
formulation of an old principle is, the more likely it is to provoke questions
about the nature of the decision maker doing the reformulating.
Ultimately, the bottom-up approach pushes legal analysis in the
direction of formulating a theory of liability in each area of law. This
theory is constructed out of our considered judgments about particular
cases. Only such a theory can contain and support the search for general
principles to explain existing case law.8 Although judges rarely attempt to
articulate such a theory in any kind of detail, their judgments are usually
informed by intuitions that fit into some theoretical framework. While the
process should be thought of as inherently open-ended, so that we should
never be too confident that we have found the theory that settles everything
once and for all, the effort to formulate a rationale that goes beyond
existing particular instances is a crucial step in the development of the law.
By contrast, the top-down model starts with a general theory and uses it to
derive more precise rules for concrete cases from it; these rules, in turn,
guide and constrain adjudication. According to this approach, theorizing is
mostly the job of the legislature. If the legislature properly fulfills its
function of working out a comprehensive moral theory and drafting the
specific rules necessary to deal with all possible fact situations, there should
be little need for adjudicators to engage with the large moral principles
underlying the rules.
As is already apparent, the bottom-up model combines the lawmaking and adjudicative functions of a legal system. The separation of
these two functions is more natural to the top-down model. In a democratic
age, it is to be expected that a democratically representative body would be
charged with the task of norm creation. The job of adjudication would
ideally be a modest one, confined to settling factual disputes and deciding
whether a given set of facts fall within the rules laid down. Any more
ambitious activity on the part of adjudicators would be characterized as a
usurpation of the democratic process.
The idealistic aspect of the top-down model lies in postulating the
lawmaker's ability to articulate a comprehensive moral theory and
8 Sunstein, supra note 4 c. 2. Although Sunstein argues that rules amounting to incompletely
theorized judgments are common in law, and even crucial to the ability of the system to contain the
various political pressures it is subjected to, it seems to me that the urge to try to move to a more
completely theorized level is also pervasive. This is not to say that every judge faced with a
controversial matter makes the attempt, nor that every attempt is successful. But it is no accident that
important moments in a legal system's development are typically characterized by such an attempt.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 40, No. 2

anticipate all possible fact situations in order to draft precise rules to
govern them. A more realistic approach would acknowledge that full
determinacy in these matters is not possible. We can neither fully anticipate
all the fact situations likely to arise for consideration, nor the value
judgments to be made about them. A lawmaker may still strive under these
conditions to articulate a comprehensive system of values in a determinate
way and draft a body of precise rules instantiating them, but the scheme will
be based on current knowledge and values. Gaps will appear in the
framework as new situations arise, or as we change our minds about the
appropriate norms to govern. Some gaps may be filled through
interpretation of the rules laid down, but the greater the degree of precision
employed in drafting the rules, the less leeway there will be for
interpretation. The scheme will therefore need to be revised from time to
time. The revision process would repeat the process undertaken the first
time by articulating the values that should govern and laying down precise
rules derived from them. How onerous this task would be for the lawmaker
depends on our sense of the severity of the indeterminacies that plague us.
When our values and objectives are clear and the range of fact situations
that implicate them are unlikely to change much over time, the prospects
of producing a scheme that lays down clear, precise, and enduring rules is
good. To the extent, though, that we seek to regulate murkier issues,
frequent revision will be needed. In the context of a separation of legislative
and adjudicative functions, legitimacy concerns will confine the creative
urges of adjudicators. Democratic principles again press in the direction of
giving the amendment task, beyond minor interpretive adjustments, to a
democratically representative body.
This acknowledgment of indeterminacy brings out a pitfall of the
top-down model. Its ideal functioning depends on the lawmaker having
worked out a general theory that grounds the rules, even though typically
only the rules themselves will be enacted. If the ambition of drafting a web
of specific rules is pursued in circumstances in which the lawmaker has
been unable to work from a comprehensive moral theory or unable to
anticipate the range of fact situations likely to arise and calling for
regulation, the drafted rules will be without adequate moral foundation and
seriously incomplete. Yet their precision will hinder adjudicators from
filling the gaps that will inevitably come to light over time. The rules
enacted will be mere pigeonholes-lists of "does" and "don'ts", "cans" and
"can'ts", "ins" and "outs" without grounding in a durable theory of human
interaction. If the rules can be amended or changed with ease, the need for
constant revision may not matter. However, if change is cumbersome and
therefore happens only infrequently, the existing pigeonholes will seem
increasingly arbitrary to those unfairly squeezed in or left out. If the
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standing weakness of the bottom-up method is its susceptibility to a
challenge of its legitimacy when the overeager principle seeker becomes too
ambitious, the comparable weakness of the top-down model is its
inflexibility when faced with unanticipated situations.
Both models in their ideal form include both a general moral theory
governing human interaction and more precise rules regulating concrete
action. The top-down model starts with the theory and derives the concrete
rules from it. The bottom-up model starts with paradigm fact situations and
works up from the reasons for decision in such cases to intermediate
general principles and ultimately to a provisional general theory. Some
connection to the general theory is the lifeblood of the concrete rules. If the
connection is cut, rule application becomes mere pigeonholing. Each
approach must find its own response to the central dilemma of law-making:
combining flexibility with political accountability.
In our legal tradition, each model is associated with a particular
institution, but there is no intrinsic connection between approach and
agent. Legislatures or courts can employ either model. In the early stages
of the development of doctrine, the common-law courts must pursue
something like the bottom-up model. The institutional limitations on
adjudicative bodies are well-known and much analyzed. They do not have
the necessary resources, nor do the data of individual cases give them
sufficient material to work with, to develop from scratch a comprehensive
theory to regulate a particular field. But once an area of doctrine has
become richly developed and much analyzed, larger theories do develop,
and decision making in particular cases becomes more like the application
of a general set of principles to individual fact situations. On the other
hand, there is a corrupt version of the bottom-up model that reproduces
the inflexibility to which the top-down model is prone. As I have articulated
it, the bottom-up model requires adjudicators to take on the responsibility
of trying to move progressively toward a more determinate justification for
legal doctrine while continuing to test emerging theories against society's
reactions to their consequences in new concrete cases. In the hands of
adjudicators who do not fully take up this challenge, the bottom-up method
has no "up"; decision making remains mired in the facts of particular cases,
and courts stick closely to the decided case law, a self-imposed exercise in
pigeonholing. There have been periods during which this arid approach
characterized the common law, and, of course, it continues to tempt some
of the judges some of the time.
Similarly, there is no guarantee that all statutes will be the product
of a comprehensive moral theory, accurately converted into a precise
system of rules. Instead, the legislative law-making process may mimic the
bottom-up method and be based on little more than a vague sense of the
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values at stake and a firm conviction about how they apply in a handful of
concrete situations. If a lawmaker enacts rules narrowly dealing only with
the easy cases anticipated, the conventional understanding of the division
of labour between legislators and adjudicators will produce another board
of pigeonholes. Inflexibility will plague such a statute and those subjected
to its regulation. Avoiding this result requires either fast tracking necessary
legislative reforms as the need for them becomes apparent, or drafting the
norms in such a way as to confer discretion on adjudicators to do the work
of developing the indeterminate norms with which the legislature started.
The former strategy will often not be feasible; the latter prompts the same
legitimacy issues that law-making by adjudicators always arouses.
Any complex legal system is likely to employ both abstract lawmaking methods. Which method is employed in any given area ought to
depend on our conception of the nature of the phenomenon to be
regulated. If the issue at hand involves clear, relatively determinate
objectives and the situation in which it arises is stable, greater precision is
possible. However, in a great many areas of law such precision is neither
possible nor desirable. To pursue the top-down model in circumstances to
which it is ill-suited is likely to result, as Hart warned, in "settling in
advance, but also in the dark, issues which can only reasonably be settled
when they arise and are identified." 9 In the presence of significant
indeterminacies of either value or facts, issues are perhaps better left to be
worked out over time through the bottom-up method.
This contrast between the two philosophies of norm creation and
adjudication can be used to examine the development of human rights
legislation and the form current codes typically take."° I argue that the
history of law-making in the area of discrimination law has been
characterized more by pigeonholing than working from or toward a general
theory about what discrimination is and why it is wrong. Is discrimination
capable of being defined in a cut and dry manner, after our having
anticipated all possible scenarios and decided which should be regulated
and how? Or does discrimination refer to a problem of human interaction
that is fluid and constantly manifesting itself in new forms such that we
have no clear sense of all the circumstances in which it might arise in future
or what to do about them? If the latter, our method of designing norms to
regulate it should be equally fluid and open to change. To judge from the
pattern of development of anti-discrimination law, one would have to
conclude that a complete general theory of discrimination has never
9 Hart, supra note 3 at 130.
101 will mainly refer to the Ontario legislation, but the same could be true about most, if not all,
Canadian codes.
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informed legislative efforts and is still unavailable. Yet much of the law is
drafted with precision that would be appropriate only if dictated by such a
theory, one in which we could have confidence. This gives little discretion
to the adjudicator to adapt the law to accommodate a new but deserving
situation, even though cases inevitably arise which do not fit existing legal
categories. The complainants in these cases will have to be told that there
is no remedy for what happened to them until the legislature amends the
law." The precision of the rules also creates little incentive for adjudicators
to search for a theory capable of explaining the rationale for the rules and
guiding their intelligent development over time. Indeed, the more precise
the rules, the more likely that adjudicative attempts to fill in gaps and
develop norms will be met with the criticism that adjudicators have no
authority to amend the rules laid down by Parliament. The lower status in
the legal hierarchy of administrative tribunals, who are charged with first
instance adjudication in the discrimination context, only exacerbates this
tendency. The problem with discrimination law over the last fifty years has
been that of bringing into alignment the nature of the phenomenon and the
norm creation and an adjudication process that suits it.
II.

PIGEONHOLING DISCRIMINATION

The story of the Canadian courts' refusal to use their authority to
create a cause of action for any form of discrimination is well-known.
Invited to hold that public policy could be invoked to render unlawful a
tavern owner's refusal to serve a black man, the Supreme Court, in Christie
v. York 2 , refused to ride that unruly horse. Although Christiewas decided
under Quebec law, courts in common law provinces accepted its authority
for upholding freedom of contract even at the expense of denying the harm
of discrimination. 3 The Courts' refusal to intervene left it up to the
legislatures to fill the gap.14 Although I think these judgments unfortunately
represent a pigeonholing mindset within the relevant areas of the common
In rare instances, a complainant will be able to invoke the Charterto fill a gap in the
statute,
as happened in Viend v. The Queen in RightofAlberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493. The analysis of the wisdom
of Charter intervention in such cases should produce the kind of search for principle that ought to
inform equality litigation. However, from the point of view of the average complainant in a
discrimination action, Charter litigation is the most expensive and least accessible form of adjudicative
norm development.
12 [1940] S.C.R. 136 [hereinafter Christie]. For a complete discussion, see J.W. Walker, Race
Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal
History and Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997).
13 Tarnopolsky & Pentney, supra note I at 1-24.
14 According to Walker, supra note 12 at 143-44, the legislature was not initially eager to step in,
preferring to pass the buck back to the courts.
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law, spelling out how it might have been different at common law is not
part of my present purpose. 5 Instead, I want to examine how the
legislatures responded to the task of creating norms to deal with the
problem of discrimination. 6
Legislative rule making in this area can be characterized as a
version of a bottom-up approach without the "up." Rather than starting
with a comprehensive theory of equality, the legislature has identified
successive paradigmatic cases of behaviour that should be prohibited, and
has decided each particular case by drafting precise rules targeting that
behaviour. 7 Three aspects of the paradigmatic cases that have been
provided for stand out. The first is the type of good or opportunity that is
denied, or in other words, the contexts within which discrimination is
prohibited. The second is the grounds upon which an individual is denied
a good or opportunity, or the bases of unlawful discrimination. The last
covers the circumstances that make a denial unlawful, or what I would call
the fault standard for discrimination.
Legislation with respect to the first two aspects of unlawful
discrimination has developed into a detailed system of rules about who
cannot do what to whom in what context. For some time, the third
aspect-the heart of discrimination law--was much less precisely
articulated in the legislation. However, I shall argue below that even here
there are signs that the legislature was operating with a paradigm case in
mind, which the legislation reflects in its precise exemption of some forms
of behaviour from the general prohibition against discrimination. In any
event, although we now have a fairly detailed web of rules that is far more
complex and intricate than the original legislation, it is not clear that we are
much closer to a theory that animates the scheme.
After illustrating the case-by-case methodology that the legislature
seems to have followed by tracing the legislative history of the provisions
governing the contexts in which discrimination is prohibited and the
15 This task has been taken up recently by A. Reichman, "Professional Status and the Freedom
to Contract: Toward a Common Law Duty of Non-Discrimination" (2001) 14 Can. J. L. & Jur. 79; and
some years ago by H.L. Molot, "The Duty of Business to Serve the Public: Analogy to the Innkeeper's
Obligation" (1968) 46 Can. Bar Rev. 612.
16 Again, in extolling the virtues of the bottom-up methodology usually considered at home in
the common law courts, I do not mean to paper over the flaws of the courts as historical institutions.
I do mean to separate the methodology within the common law from the ultra-conservative, laissezfaire political values that have sometimes informed its use. I take this to be no different from the way
that the top-down method can be used by one legislature to institute a progressive legal scheme and
by another in pursuit of a conservative agenda.
17
This builds on an argument made by N. Gupta, ReconsideringBhadauria:A Re-examination
of
the Roles of the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the Courts in the Fight Against Discrimination
(LL.M. Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law 1993) [unpublished] c. 4.
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prohibited grounds of discrimination, I will briefly examine two issues that
have arisen in the interpretation of the prohibited grounds in order to
demonstrate the stifling effects of this pigeonholing. In the process, I will
argue that only the search for a more principled formulation of the
prohibited grounds will push us in the direction of a better understanding
of the prohibition and enable the legal system to deal creatively and
effectively with changes in circumstances and our understanding of those
circumstances. I will then turn to the question of what I refer to as the fault
standard in discrimination law to show that, in a more subtle way, its
elaboration too is plagued by the same problems and requires the same
kind of solution.
My conclusion is that given the indeterminacies surrounding the
phenomenon of discrimination, the legal rules governing it must build in
the possibility of growth and incremental change. So far, law-making has
tended to pronounce on particular types of concrete cases without
incorporating into the law sufficient reference to the underlying values that
inform the particular judgments. Adjudicators are therefore left to apply
relatively static rules. The legislature would have been better advised to
enact core principles, not purporting to constitute a complete theory but
pitched at an intermediate level of abstraction, explicitly leaving it up to
adjudicators to do the work of case-by-case development and refinement
of the principles through interpretation in the context of concrete fact
situations.'" Using as a model the typical process of reasoning that informs
tort law doctrine, I will describe how some core elements of the cause of
action for discrimination could be reconceptualized.
A.

Contexts and Grounds: The Apotheosis of the Pigeonhole

The Ontario legislature began to prohibit discrimination in the
1940s by targeting a single, narrowly defined problem: the phenomenon of
shopkeepers and other service providers announcing their unwillingness to
deal with non-white members of the public by displaying "Whites Only"

18

According to M. Morin, my suggested approach has much in common with that of Portalis, the

celebrated drafter of the first French Civil Code, perhaps confirming that the common-law method,
which inspires my efforts, and the codification approach need not be considered sharply contrasting
methods of norm creation. M. Morin, "Portalis c. Bentham? Les objectifs assignds a la codification du
droit civil et du droit p6nal en France, en Angleterre et au Canada" in Commission du Droit du
Canada, La ligislation en question (Ottawa: Commission du Droit du Canada, 2000) at 139-217. An
English version, revised by the author, is available: "Portalis v. Bentham?: The Objectives Pursued by
the Codification of the Civil and Criminal Law in France, England and Canada," online: Law
Commission of Canada <http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/gr/rlIldi1999.pdf> (date accessed: 23 July
2002).
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signs. This behaviour was prohibited by the Racial DiscriminationAct.19
Within a decade, it was decided that discrimination in employment was
objectionable, and so the Fair Employment PracticesAct 2 was enacted.
Around the same time, the legislature decided that it was unfair to pay
women less for the same work performed by a male employee, and
prohibited such activity in The Female Employees FairRemuneration Act,
1951.21 Shortly

thereafter, the legislature decided that it was not enough to
prohibit the posting or publishing of notices of a discriminatory sort to
ensure equal access to goods and services, so it prohibited the denial of
"accommodation, services or facilities available in any place to which the
public is customarily admitted, 22 on discriminatory grounds. A few years
later, the problem of people being denied rental accommodation on the
private market came to the legislature's attention; the FairAccommodation
PracticesAct was amended to prohibit discriminatory denial of "occupancy
in any building containing more than six units. 2 3 The legislation was later
further expanded to prohibit discrimination in the provision of all goods,
services, and facilities. 24 This was a response to organizations such as
children's sports leagues slipping out of liability for excluding girls by
arguing that this was not a service or facility customarily available to the
public but rather customarily available only to boys.
Each new statute added a separate pigeonhole-a new, relatively
precise prohibition-to the overall scheme. The first consolidation of all
these anti-discrimination provisions was the Ontario Code of 1962.2 It
collected in a single statute the various contexts in which discrimination had
been prohibited in the past. Periodic reconsolidations have followed the
same pattern. Thus, the modern codes typically include provisions creating
a cause of action for discrimination in employment, housing, and provision
19 S.O. 1944, c.
51.
S.O. 1951, c. 24.
21 S.O. 1951, c. 26.
22 FairAccommodation PracticesAct, 1954, S.O. 1954, c. 28.
23
24

FairAccommodation PracticesAmendment Act, 1960-61, S.O. 1960-61, c.
28.
See Re Ontario Human Rights Commission et al. and OntarioRuralSoftball Association (1979),

102 D.L.R. (3d) 303 (C.A.); Re Cummings and OntarioMinor Hockey Association (1979), 26 O.R. (2d)
7 (C.A.). The legislation was amended in 1981. See FairAccommodationPracticesActS.O. 1981, c. 53,
s. 1. In recommending expansion, the Ontario Human Rights Commission remarked that the limitation
to places to which the public is customarily admitted "had particular relevance in the 1950's and 1960's
to the elimination of discrimination in hotels and restaurants," the very contexts in which the common
law judges failed to act, thus provoking the legislative initiative. See Ontario Human Rights
Commission, Life Together: A Report on Human Rights in Ontario (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights
Commission, 1977) at 48 [hereinafter Life Together].
25 S.O. 1961-62, c. 93 [hereinafter Code].
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of goods and services. Since 1962, Ontario has added a general prohibition
on discrimination in contracting to round out the modem contexts within
which discrimination is prohibited.
A similar pattern can be traced with respect to the prohibited
grounds of discrimination. The list of grounds has grown over the years, but
that growth looks less like the result of the legislature's attempts to work
out a general theory about who deserves the law's protection, than the ad
hoc application of band-aids as the Ontario Human Rights Commission has
publicized the plight of groups of people left out of the Code's protection.
Anti-discrimination legislation in Ontario started by identifying the
paradigm cases of race and religion. Given the monumental struggles to
liberate blacks from slavery and the catastrophic rise of anti-Semitism
throughout the western world in the 1930s, the case for protecting these
groups from discrimination in various contexts was an easy one. New
grounds were added only gradually as cases arose and the victims of these
forms of discrimination had to be turned away by the system. In the midst
of an immigration boom, the first employment discrimination law sensibly
went beyond the protected categories of race and creed present in the
RacialDiscriminationAct, 1944 to encompass "colour, nationality, ancestry
or place of origin, 26 as well. However, it neglected to include sex, marital
status, family status, or age, not to mention sexual orientation, disability, or
poverty. These other grounds were added in dribs and drabs: age
discrimination was dealt with in a separate statute in 1966,27 sex and marital
status were not included until 1972,28 family status and handicap in 1981,29
and sexual orientation only in 1986.30 This process of piecemeal reform led
the Ontario Human Rights Commission in its 1977 report, Life Together,
to complain that "the legislation is now riddled with anomalies and
hamstrung by limitations which render it increasingly unable to address the
burgeoning human rights needs of this province."'"
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, in respect of both these
aspects of the problem of discrimination, the legislature has adopted the
bottom-up method of case-by-case rule-making by waiting for fact
situations not yet covered by the rules to present themselves and then
deciding how they should be handled. Given our legal system's lack of
experience with equality as a norm, perhaps a case-by-case method was the
26 FairEmployment PracticesAct, 1951, supra note 20.
27 TheAge DiscriminationAct, 1966, S.O. 1966, c. 3, s. 2.
28

An Act to Amend the Human Rights Code, S.O. 1972, c. 119.

29 Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 53.
30 Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c. 64.
31 Life Together, supra note 24 at 8.
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best way to start. It is not to be expected that the legislature would be able
to articulate at the outset a comprehensive theory in such uncharted
territory. But it is not clear that the legislature has taken the next
step-moving towards an articulation of the deeper principles that explain
the concrete cases. At least, it has not done so in the statute itself. Yet the
enactment of precisely enumerated contexts within which discrimination is
prohibited and prohibited grounds of differentiation has given adjudicators
little leeway to develop such principles on the basis of which coverage to
new categories could be extended. Instead, every time a new deserving case
crops up, it requires an act of the legislature to deal with it, with all the
delays attendant upon gearing up such a complex machine to handle what
are often fine matters of detail, not to mention the risk of political
opportunism or obstructionism at the expense of vulnerable minority
groups. The result is a statute that resembles a board of pigeonholes,
requiring legislative intervention to add new holes as needed.
B.

The Interpretive Effects of PigeonholingProhibitedGrounds

1.

Square Pegs into Round Holes

A more fluid form of norm creation is necessary to give
adjudicators the tools to gradually extend the coverage of the Code as new
variations on the discrimination theme arise. The process of enumerating
discrete prohibited grounds of discrimination has been going on for more
than fifty years, and deserving groups are still left out. Despite these
continuing gaps, there has been no attempt to reformulate the criteria for
inclusion in the Code's protection in terms of a general principle, even
though we now have enough experience to do so.
Let me illustrate the inadequacies of the existing pigeonholes and
the superiority of a principled approach through the example of the
struggle to obtain coverage for the obese.32 Obesity is not itself a prohibited
ground of discrimination under the Code, nor does it comfortably fit under
any of the other grounds. Efforts have been made to argue that it is a form
of discrimination on the basis of disability or "handicap," as it is labeled in
the Code, but the definition of handicap in the Code is rendered in
32 See Gupta, supra note 17. The leading Canadian cases are Ontario (Human Rights
Commission) v. Vogue Shoes (1991), 14 C.H.R.R. D/425 and Davison v. St. Paul Lutheran Home of
Melville, Sask. (1993), 19 C.H.R.R. D/437. A similar story could be told using the attempts to portray
pregnancy discrimination and sexual harassment as sex discrimination, or sexual orientation
discrimination as family-status discrimination. The former cases met with some success. See Brooks
v. CanadaSafeway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 and Janzen v. Platy Enterprises (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 352
(S.C.C.)). However, the latter case failed. See Canada(Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R.
554 [hereinafter Mossop].
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incredibly precise terms.33 In particular, it ties disability to the effects of
"bodily injury, birth defect, or illness," whereas the causes of obesity are
often unknown, making it impossible to establish the link to illness.
Occasionally complainants may succeed in fitting their claim into the
category of sexual harassment, when it has been clear that the respondent's
behaviour was informed by derogatory attitudes about gender, but this
covers only a subset of obesity cases.
Yet it is clear that the obese suffer many of the same forms of
disadvantage in the workforce, in acquiring accommodation, and in access
to goods and services as those in protected categories: they are stigmatized,
denied opportunities, and paid less than others-all without sound basis.34
The assault on human dignity suffered by the obese is as severe as in other
cases of discrimination and the tangible disadvantage is as harmful. Thus,
if this group is to be recognized as discriminated against, another
amendment to the legislation is necessary. Even if this amendment is
forthcoming, it will merely add another pigeonhole to the board. By itself,
another addition moves us no closer to a theory about why these various
groups deserve protection, and the fact that the existing enumerated
grounds function as discrete pigeonholes means that adjudicators have little
incentive or institutional legitimacy to develop a general theory. Instead,
they get wrapped up in trying to fit square pegs into round
holes-determining whether there is sufficient evidence of a physiological
cause of this complainant's obesity to justify fitting it under the rubric of
illness even though it is plain that prejudice against the obese usually stems
from the belief that it is not an illness, but rather due to lack of selfdiscipline.
With each debate about the legislative addition of a new
pigeonhole, we have, in fact, been developing an implicit sense of what
33 The full definition is as follows: s. 10 (1): "because of handicap" means for
the reason that the
person has or has had, or is believed to have or have had,
(a) any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement that is caused
by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
including diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, any degree or paralysis, amputation, lack of physical
coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness
or speech impediment, or physical reliance on a guide dog or on a wheelchair or other
remedial appliance or device,
(b) a condition of mental retardation or impairment,
(c) a learning disability, or a disfunction in one or more of the processes involved in
understanding or using symbols or spoken language,
(d) a mental disorder, or
(e) an injury or disability for which benefits were claimed or received under Workers
CompensationAct.
34 J.P.R. Howard, "Incomplete and Indifferent: The Law's Recognition
of Obesity
Discrimination" (1995) 17 Advocates' Q. 338.
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sorts of attributes should not be used as a basis for decisions having a
detrimental impact on the individual. It is long overdue to attempt to

render this in an abstract principle, leaving its further concrete extension
to be managed by adjudicators. Legislation could make it unlawful to

discriminate on the basis of an attribute that either has been, or comes to
be, the basis of unfair derogatory stereotypes, or one that individuals
cannot fairly be required to change in order to enjoy full participation in

society, whether because the attribute is immutable or simply within the
range of human commitments deserving of respect." This approach would
make it possible for coverage to be naturally extended to the obese (and
other new cases).36 In the context of equality rights under the Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms,7 a provision involving a more open-ended

formulation of the prohibited grounds of discrimination, the Supreme
Court of Canada has recently begun to develop an abstract set of principles
along these lines. 8 No deep consensus has yet been achieved; there is still
much work to be done in excavating our social knowledge about the
enumerated grounds of prohibited discrimination in order to develop a

theory readily able to guide extension to new contexts, but the process has
begun. Meanwhile, human rights code jurisprudence is stuck in a style of
adjudication that insists on matching litigants to prefabricated categories,
rather than engaging in a process of continually redesigning the categories
to meet human needs. Furthermore, were it possible for private-sector
discrimination complainants to participate in this search for principle, there
is every reason to expect that the resulting theory would be richer and more
35 It is important, I think, not to put too much emphasis on the idea that it is the immutability of
attributes that should render improper their use to condition benefits. I see immutability as simply the
extreme case of situations in which it is unfair to expect someone to change an important aspect of
personality in order to gain access to important social opportunities and benefits, or suffer the
consequences of exclusion.
36 For an analysis that argues for the usefulness of enumerated grounds of discrimination
provided that they are understood to be capable of expansion, see D. Pothier, "Connecting Grounds
of Discrimination to Real People's Real Experiences" (2001) 13 C.J.W.L. 37. 1see my suggestion of
reformulating into an abstract principle what we learn about discrimination by considering why certain
grounds are likely to be problematic not as denying that enumerated grounds have a use, but as better
facilitating the process of growth.
37 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.),
1982,
c. 11.
38 See especially the dissenting judgment of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Egan v. Canada,[1995]
2 S.C.R. 513 at 548-52, which seems to have started a more reflective process of considering what the
enumerated grounds have in common and how they are tied to the fundamental purposes of section
15. This process has been continued in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[ 1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [hereinafter Law]; and more explicitly in Corbirev. Canada (Ministerof Indian and
NorthernAffairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 in the judgments of both Justices McLachlin and Bastarache, as
well as Justice L'Heureux-Dub.

20021

Of Pigeonholes and Principles

nuanced than that which will arise out of constitutional deliberation on its
own. The tableau of cases arising in the private sector is itself richer and

more varied than the range of disputes likely to arise out of interactions
between government and citizens, and it is against such variety in context
and circumstance that a principle is best tested and refined.
This way of conceptualizing the forbidden bases of discrimination
is intrinsically tied, as it should be, to the developing understanding of the
human interests that discrimination legislation should be seeking to
protect.39 In keeping with the main threads of section 15(1) jurisprudence,
I take those interests to include at least these two: the protection of human

dignity and fair opportunity to enjoy access to important goods. Both are
bound up with the human good of autonomy. The elaboration of the dignity
interest at stake will go hand in hand with the developing understanding of
the ways in which categorization on the basis of various attributes is

stigmatizing, demeaning, or disrespectful. The idea that there are some
things about oneself one should not have to change in order to get ahead
will inform and be informed by our developing sense of what the fair
opportunity for full participation in society means. Saying that what human
rights law needs is the development of a full theory of what human dignity
means and what full participation requires does not, of course, guarantee

that the theory as elaborated by a court or the courts at any point in time

will be correct.4" While it is true that abstract concepts give courts a great
deal of discretion, both for better and for worse, when advance precision
is impossible we have no choice but to take our chances with the process of
incremental development of legal norms. Each bad judgment must simply
become an opportunity for critique and further reflection.

39 Charter jurisprudence inchoately recognizes this in the debate that has
been ongoing in the
Supreme Court with respect to whether the test for a section 15(l) violation involves three steps or two
steps, and in the slippage between the second and third aspects of the Law test. See Law, ibid.;
Corbi~re, ibid.
40 Thus, while I do not disagree with the criticisms made by Pothier, supra note 36 at 49-56, of
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration,
[2000]1 S.C.R. 703 and Lovelace v. Ontario, [200011 S.C.R. 950, 1 think it is a mistake to attribute the
inadequacies of the judgments to the fact that the focus of section 15 decision making has now become
the protection of human dignity. Rather, in these cases one might argue that the Court has focused
too narrowly on the connection between demeaning a group or individual and violation of dignity. It
is to be hoped that the concept of human dignity will come to be seen as more capacious than that. For
a preliminary effort to push in the direction of enlarging the concept, see D.G. R6aume, "Harm and
Fault in Discrimination Law: The Transition from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination"
(2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 349.
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Intersectionality Revisited
The effort to state the basis upon which discrimination is

impermissible in a more principled fashion would also help alleviate
another problem created by a pigeonholing mentality. Nitya Duclos has
effectively illustrated how the pigeonholes that currently define the
prohibited grounds of discrimination can work injustice upon those who
find themselves disadvantaged because of a combination of enumerated
attributes.41 The itemization of grounds encourages adjudicators to analyze
fact situations through the lens of one alleged ground of discrimination at
a time.42 In analyzing what is wrong with this approach, we can illustrate
once more the value of going beyond the enumerated grounds of
discrimination as inert categories stating conditions for the imposition of
liability, to articulate principles explaining why discrimination on these
bases is unacceptable. The treatment of the statutorily enumerated grounds
as both "isolated" and "homogenous '' 43 gives rise to two main problems.
The first problem involves situations in which adjudicators fail to
notice how the combination of factors actually compounds the injury to the
complainant. The case of Alexander v. British Columbia44 illustrates the
problem very well. The respondent liquor store manager refused to serve
Alexander because he thought she was drunk. In fact, she had a motor
impairment that affected her gait and speech, and she was partially blind.
Alexander was also a First Nations woman. The tribunal found for the
complainant, but characterized the discrimination as being solely on the
basis of disability. Here, the worry is that the adjudicator's tendency to
focus on a single (perhaps the strongest) ground for the complaint means
that the full flavour of the injury is overlooked. Perhaps the adjudicator
read these facts correctly-perhaps the respondent would have treated
anyone with this disability in the same way, regardless of her race. But it
would scarcely stretch credulity to imagine that the respondent was
influenced by the fact that the complainant was Aboriginal, perhaps
N. Duclos, "Disappearing Women: Racial Minority Women in Human Rights
Cases" (1993)
6 C.J.W.L. 25 (hereinafter "Disappearing Women"]. See also Pothier, supra note 36 at 22ff.
42 The same tendency seems to affect cases in which there is some dispute about whether to find
that discrimination on the basis of a prohibited ground occurred or to attribute the respondent's
behaviour to an attribute not protected by the law. As illustrated by Mossop, supra note 32, this can
result in the complainant being placed exclusively in the no-liability pigeonhole, through a finding that
the alleged discrimination was based on a non-prohibited ground For a discussion of this tendency,
see N. Iyer (formerly Duclos), "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social
Identity" (1994) 19 Q.L.J. 194 [hereinafter "Categorical Denials"].
Iyer, ibid. at 192-93.
(1989), 10 C.H.R.R. D/5871.
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assuming too quickly that she must be drunk because she was Aboriginal.
In focusing exclusively on the disability basis of the complaint, the tribunal
missed an opportunity to examine how much more insulting it is likelyto
be to a First Nations person than to others to be treated this way. In other
words, using the enumerated grounds as pigeonholes-as mutually
exclusive logical categories into only one of which a single individual can
fit-obscures a central issue in the case: what harm was done to the
complainant by the respondent's behaviour?
The second kind of intersectionality case that has been badly
handled is one in which the two (or more) grounds of discrimination are
both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of the bad treatment. In
other words, had either ground not been present, the other would not have
elicited the discriminatory conduct or effect. This situation is illustrated by
the American case, De Graffenreid v. General Motors,45 in which a black

woman was not allowed to make a Title VII complaint that the respondent
discriminated against those who were both black and women. The
argument against recovery in these sorts of cases seems to be that if the
respondent can show that he has hired black men and that he has hired
white women, there has been neither race discrimination nor sex
discrimination. The hiring of black men shows that the employer does not
discriminate on the basis of race and the hiring of white women shows that
it does not discriminate on the basis of sex. In such cases, the focus on each
ground to the exclusion of the other makes the discrimination disappear.
The enumeration of discrete prohibited grounds seems to foster this
approach, as though the correct procedure were to run one's finger down
the list of prohibited grounds and noting that "black women" is not one of
the categories, deny a claim, just as one would deny a claim to recovery for
discrimination on the basis of obesity because it is an attribute that is not
on the list. At a deeper level, this result implies that discrimination on the
basis of a particular factor is uniform, so that all members of a given group
must be similarly affected or discrimination is not made out; 46 it conveys the
impression that there is a homogeneity to each category as well as a
separation between them.
The physicality of the pigeonhole image captures well the implicit
approach in both these kinds of situations.47 If the complainant has already
been put into one pigeonhole, the same peg cannot also occupy another,
different hole. A complainant who straddles two such pigeonholes does not
45413 F.Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
46 "Disappearing Women", supra note 41 at 34, 43; "Categorical Denials", supra note 42.
47 lyer in "Categorical Denials", supra note 42, uses the image of "pockets" to convey a similar
sense of the physical impossibility of occupying two categories at the same time.
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properly fit into either of them. So how would the pursuit of a more
bottom-up method make a difference? To begin with, ideally we would be
working not with a code that lists prohibited grounds, but rather one that
gives a more general description of the sorts of attributes that should not
be belittled or used to restrict opportunity. This would make it natural to
examine hard cases not by merely looking for a perfectly fitting pigeonhole,
but by examining whether the case in hand exemplifies the form of harm
that the statute seeks to protect against. But even if we must work from an
enumerated list, that list could be treated as the equivalent of the initial
range of easy cases decided through a case-by-case method; that is, raw
material out of which to construct a more general principle. This approach
would require asking deeper questions about why each of these attributes
might be on the list and using that inquiry in the interpretive exercise of
responding to a fact situation involving the intersection of two or more
factors.
Even a sophomoric effort in this direction would tell us that the list
includes examples of attributes toward which some people have derogatory
attitudes leading them to stigmatize others as inferior. This we understand
to constitute a serious harm to human dignity, so it is prohibited to deny
someone access to a good or opportunity because one thinks that he or she
is unworthy of common respect. This much is already well established in
section 15(1) jurisprudence.48 With this understanding of the point of
discrimination law,49 there is no need to separate the two aspects of a
person's complaint, and personality, in a case like Alexander. The law
defines acting with certain reasons as discriminatory because it is an assault
on dignity. If someone performs a given act for more than one of the
outlawed reasons, he or she has, insofar as the dignitary interest at stake is
concerned, committed two wrongs. Each wrongful reason constitutes an
independent insult; together they magnify the harm suffered.
In other words, focusing on only one of two interacting grounds of
discrimination extends the pigeonholing approach beyond the drafting style
of the statute to our understanding of the harm of discrimination,
preventing adjudicators from seeing the whole wrong and its impact on the
whole person. There is more than a passing resemblance here to the
difficulty judges have had in the past with the idea of concurrent liability in
tort and contract. There have been times when tort and contract were
treated as mutually exclusive pigeonholes, forcing plaintiffs to choose
between categories to describe the wrong committed against them. But, of
48 See the survey of previous case law by Justice lacobucci in Law, supra note 38.
491 emphasize that this is only part of the purpose of discrimination law. I would not want to be
taken to be arguing that discrimination law is limited to the control of bigoted behaviour.
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course, we now understand that a single act can constitute more than one
wrong. 0 Indeed, this now seems self-evident in a way that makes us wonder
how judges could have ever not seen it. The idea that slotting fact situations
into specific pigeonholes is the way to decide cases obscures the truth. Once
we see the inadequacy of this approach, all that is left is to work through
the remedial implications of overlapping grounds of liability to make sure
that the plaintiff/complainant is not doubly compensated.
If we recognize that the roots of each of the enumerated grounds
in discrimination law lie in the interest in human dignity, instead of insisting

on putting each case in a single pigeonhole and then confining the
discussion to how the complainant was affected in that respect, the various
aspects of the respondent's attitude toward the complainant come together
to contribute to an analysis of the total indignity inflicted on the
complainant." As Duclos points out, there is a tendency to award higher
damages in cases involving complainants who fall into more than one
disadvantaged group, indicating that this point is sometimes at least
implicitly understood. 2 Yet it would better ensure that complainants
received full compensation, and at the same time it would contribute more
to our developing understanding of the phenomenon to have a discussion
of these matters on the record, not simply operating behind the scenes. 3
Such a discussion would develop our thinking about the human interests
that ought to be protected by discrimination law-a fundamental element
in our conception of the cause of action.
A similar analysis can be offered of the difference it makes to the
50Of course, there remains a lively debate about the limits of concurrency-the circumstances
in which the imposition of liability in tort would unacceptably undermine an exclusionary rule in
contract. See e.g. Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda)Ltd. v. SaintJohn ShipbuildingLtd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210
[hereinafter Bow Valley Husky]. In such cases a decision does have to be made about which ground of
liability takes precedence. I can see no such potential conflict between a finding of liability for
discriminating on racial grounds and a finding of liability for discriminating on disability grounds.
51 However, if we focus exclusively on the frustration of the complainant's
tangible ends
(obtaining a particular service) as the relevant harm, such cases represent harm that is overdetermined
by wrongful conduct. If we take the remedial point of a complaint to be to put the person back in the
position she would have enjoyed if not for the wrongful action, the complainant is entitled to
compensation only once for the harm of not being allowed to make a purchase. The respondent's dual
motives do not increase this aspect of the harm suffered. The two (or more) types of harm caused by
discrimination are often not clearly distinguished. Another way to articulate the critique offered here
is to say that the pigeonholing mentality has inhibited adjudicators from embarking on a more
principled investigation of the harms to be redressed by discrimination law. As ever, some conception
of the human interests protected by a cause of action is the conceptual companion of an account of
the harms for which redress is available.
52 "Disappearing Women," supra note 41 at 41.
53

Ibid. Similarly, as Duclos also points out, it would help provide a more nuanced
understanding
of sexual harassment to acknowledge the ways in which racial and other forms of stereotyping inform
such behaviour, contributing to the harm experienced by the victim.
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second type of fact situation involving intersectionality to take a principled
approach. I have always found the logic in these cases most puzzling. An
allegation that black women, for example, have been discriminated against
can be broken down into the claim that it was because of the complainant's
race and because of her sex that she was denied some opportunity. In
causal terms, each of the attributes of race (being black) and sex (being
female) is necessary for the harm to arise, but neither is sufficient. But in
no other civil claim is it necessary to establish that there is a single,
sufficient cause or explanation of the harm suffered in order to succeed.
Normally, all that matters is that the alleged wrongdoing is a "but-for"
cause or necessary condition; the existence of multiple necessary conditions
that come together to create the harm is no bar to recovery, especially when
both causes are alleged to be unlawful behaviour and are combined in the
behaviour of a single agent. By this standard, provided that a black female
complainant can show that had she been white or male, she would have
been hired (or her chances would have been improved), she ought to be
considered to have established a case for both race and sex discrimination.
To explain the flaw in the reasoning in De Graffenreid,we need to
pay attention first to the distinction between discrimination that involves
acting on prejudice and adverse-effect discrimination. The first type of
discrimination involves performing an act that disadvantages another for
particular, disrespectful reasons. The latter form of discrimination involves
denying access to goods, services, or opportunities, whatever the reasons,
if that denial cannot be justified.54 A principled approach would require
asking not whether "black women" are on the list, but whether the
employer's behaviour reveals the imposition or reinforcement of
inequality-an instance of disrespectful treatment or denial of fair
participation rights. It is possible for an employer to hold attitudes that are
based on stereotypes about, or are disrespectful toward, only the women of
a particular racial group. Indeed, many racist attitudes and stereotypes are
bifurcated along gender lines. For example, black men are associated in the
bigot's mind with violence or criminality, while black women are equated
with promiscuity. If there is reason to believe that some prejudiced, sexspecific attitude underlies this employer's behaviour, why should it matter
that he does not treat men in this group badly? He may have learned to
reconsider previously held derogatory attitudes toward the men, but not yet
been confronted about his attitudes toward the women. It may simply be
that the derogatory views he holds about the men do not come into play in
a way that creates unfair hiring criteria or working conditions. Whatever
the explanation for why the men in the group are not badly treated, it is
54 This formulation skates around the many difficult questions about what constitutesjustification
for actions having an adverse effect, but it will serve for present purposes.
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beside the point if derogatory attitudes toward the women insult their
dignity. What this reveals is that the apparent assumption underlying the
pigeonholing approach that each protected category is homogenous has a
corollary: prejudice towards members of each group is equally
homogenous. Once that assumption is exploded, there should be no further
obstacle to grounding a complaint on the intersection of two forms of
prejudice.
Similarly, it is possible that an employer's policies, while not
grounded in prejudice, could have side effects that disproportionally affect
not all members of a racialized minority or all women, but primarily racial
minority women. Imagine a case in which an educational requirement is
imposed which, because of different social conditions affecting black
women is harder for them than for white women or black men to meet. If
this barrier cannot be justified according to the usual tests, why should it be
allowed to stand once its effect on vulnerable members of society in
restricting opportunity is established? Again, the assumption that the
enumerated grounds are homogenous carries the implication that any given
act will affect all members of a particular category in exactly the same way.
More careful analysis of intersectionality cases demonstrates the falsity of
this premise. If we let these cases be an opportunity for understanding the
subtleties of discrimination and its harmful effects, rather than an exercise
in fitting human beings into prefab categories, they will often go from being
hard cases to being easy ones-from no discrimination to multiply
grounded discrimination.
C.

What Counts as Discrimination?:Developing a Fault Standardfor
Discrimination

The very fact that the Code has developed through the elaboration
of ever longer lists of prohibited grounds, and the gluing together of
independent contexts within which discrimination is prohibited itself
indicates that there is no general theory of the wrong of discrimination
informing the legislation. However, the best evidence of this lack of theory
is that the central concept of "discrimination" goes unexplicated in the
statute.5 5 In contrast with the precise list-drawing elsewhere, this might look
on the surface like the incorporation of a very abstract concept, leaving
much interpretive room for adjudicators to use it to adapt to changing
conceptions of equality based on the growing experience of the prevalence
and effects of inequality. But a closer look makes this less clear. While
Canadian legislatures have shied away from directly defining
55As noted by Tarnopolsky & Pentney, supra note I at 4-1, this absence
of a definition is true
of all but the Manitoba and Quebec statutes.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 40, NO. 2

discrimination, in the early stages they defined the exemptions to the
prohibition against discrimination in a narrow pigeonhole-like fashion,
which in turn threatened to confine the scope for growth of the concept of
discrimination itself. This has provoked what I see as an unnecessary crisis
of legitimacy in respect of a central aspect of the cause of action for
discrimination as adjudicators have had to struggle against the wording of
the statute to do what is clearly required to keep the law relevant to
modern conditions.
The debate around the first case before the Canadian courts raising
the issue of whether the law prohibited adverse-effects discrimination or
only intentional discrimination illustrates this difficulty. 6 The legislation
contained a very general prohibition of discrimination,57 yet no general
qualification on that prohibition. Indeed, the legislation included a quite
specific qualification, providing that some discrimination may be justified,
but confining the circumstances to age, sex, or marital status discrimination
when found to be a bonafide occupational requirement (BFOR). 58 Since the
allegation in the case at hand was religious discrimination, this exception
to the main prohibition was not available. The inclusion of a specific
exception was fastened upon by the lower courts59 as justification for
concluding that this was the only exception the legislature intended. This
left standing, and unqualified, the prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of creed (inter alia). If discrimination were interpreted to include
causing an adverse impact on a member of a protected group, whether
intentionally or not, this would leave respondents liable for any behaviour,
however reasonable, that happened to have a discriminatory effect. Under
these circumstances, the lower courts thought it only fair to read the
legislation narrowly to prohibit only intentional discrimination. The
Supreme Court of Canada avoided this result by reading a proviso into the
legislation that a respondent could exonerate himself by showing that he
had made reasonable efforts to accommodate the complainant's situation.6"
In other words, the Court created a new, wider exemption to
56 O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 [hereinafter O'Malley].

At the time, the relevant provision (section 4(l)(g)) of the Ontario Code said simply "No
person shall...discriminate against any employee with regard to any term or condition of employment
because of...creed...of such...employee".
Section 4(6) of the Ontario Human Rights Code provided: "The provisions of this section
relating to any discrimination...based on age, sex or marital status do not apply where age, sex or
marital status is a bona fide occupational qualification and requirement for the position of
employment."
59
OntarioHuman Rights Commission v. Simpson-Sears Ltd. (1982), 36 O.R. (2d) 59 (Ont.
S.C.);
(1982), 38 O.R. (2d) 423 (Ont. C.A.).
60 O'Malley, supra note 56.
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counterbalance the extended concept of discrimination.
Although the Supreme Court's decision better reflects the needs of
society, the lower courts' interpretation was, I think, more faithful to the
statute as written. If discrimination is limited to differential treatment
motivated by a protected characteristic, the explicit exception for age, sex,
and marital status differentiations that can be judged bona fide makes
perfect sense, since there are obvious examples of situations in which even
explicit differentiation on these grounds would be justified. (The sex of
restroom attendants is perhaps the most used example of legitimate
differentiation.) There is no need to invent any further exceptions since it
is hard to imagine intentional discrimination against those identified by any
of the other prohibited grounds as justifiable. The broader interpretation
opened up a gap in the legislation which the courts then had to fill. It
invites us to ask why, if the legislature intended a broad interpretation of
discrimination, did it not provide the obviously necessary provision to take
into account legitimate competing interests? It is more plausible, I think,
to suppose that the legislation was drafted with the easy case of
discrimination in mind-treating someone worse simply for the reason that
she is female, or non-white, or a member of a religious minority. Although
that is not made explicit in the discrimination provision itself, it is betrayed
by the narrowness of the one exception included. That is not to say that the
legislature intended that adverse effect discrimination not be prohibited;
it is more likely that no one thought about it. The legislature did not
anticipate the situation of a neutral rule or policy that has discriminatory
effects; therefore, the value judgment that its resolution requires was not
confronted.
Even if one thinks the Supreme Court reached the right decision,
one has to admit that it was in the teeth of the legislation, rather than with
its help. And not because we have reason to believe that the legislature had
decided against this expansive meaning of discrimination-we cannot
plausibly claim to have a developed theory of equality in hand and a fully
fleshed out sense of the range of fact situations likely to engage our
attention into the distant future that might ground a claim that the
legislature meant to confine the scope of discrimination.6 ' Rather, the
611 ndeed, the confirmation that the Supreme Court's result was in keeping with the legislature's
sense of where the law should be lies in the fact that as O'Malley was winding its way through the
system, the Ontario legislature was amending the Code to explicitly include liability for "constructive
discrimination." It is telling, however, that even as it enlarged the scope of liability, the legislature
chose once again to do it through the construction of a new pigeonhole. Instead of revising the basic
provisions of the Code making discrimination unlawful so as to directly expand the notion of
discrimination to encompass the adverse-effect concept, the legislature enacted a separate provision
making it an infringement of rights "where a requirement... is imposed that is not discrimination on a
prohibited ground but that would result in the exclusion, restriction or preference of a group of persons
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legislation seems to have been drafted with a single paradigm case (bigotry)
in mind. When a court, operating under the bottom-up method, contents
itself with announcing an outcome for a given fact situation rather than
contributing to the ongoing construction of a theory, it is generally
understood that later courts are in no way precluded from considering new
fact situations, or making a more ambitious attempt to rationalize the
existing case law. However, when the legislature lays down precise rules,
this generally precludes regulation of uncovered situations. Democratic
conceptions of legitimacy prescribe that it should be the legislature that
makes decisions about how and when the law is to be extended. Therefore,
to legislate with more precision than the subject matter makes sensible
inhibits the law's organic development. Instead of being changed and
adapted incrementally, the law lurches from plateau to plateau. Or, if
adjudicators try to keep the law abreast of social conditions, their efforts
are likely to provoke unnecessary crises of legitimacy.
The absence of a definition of discrimination in human rights codes
has been remarked upon by commentators, often with at least a tinge of
disapproval.62 But we should, I think, be neither surprised nor particularly
regretful at the absence of a definition. Definitions are all very well if we
know precisely what we want and can capture it adequately in a verbal
formula. A definition here would require a comprehensive theory of
equality, a highly contested and very complex matter, and something that
presently eludes us. Under these circumstances, an early attempt to define
the concept with precision would only have more tightly confined us to
society's understanding of the paradigm cases at the time of enactment, and
that would limit the law's ability to develop as it confronts new fact
situations until the legislature could get around to amending the legislation.
Pressed to define discrimination, the drafters of the Code when the adverse
effects issue arose would likely have done so even more explicitly in terms
of the paradigm of differential treatment based on prejudice. With efforts
to segregate the races visible everywhere at the time, it is not surprising that
this should be considered the paradigmatic evil to be addressed. At that
who are identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination... ."Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981,
c. 53,s. 10 (now section 11), as amended, Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 1986, c. 64.
This formulation seems to concede that adverse-effect "discrimination" is not really discrimination,
but will be made unlawful anyway. It creates a new basis for liability, but not by creating a new concept
of discrimination. When the Supreme Court later, in Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway, [198512
S.C.R. 561, read such blanket exceptions to the duty not to discriminate as applying to employer
policies as a whole rather than their application to individuals, thereby negating the possibility of a duty
to accommodate created in O'Malley, the legislature was forced to revise the statute yet again.
62 Tarnopolsky & Pentney, supra, note I at4-1-4-4; B. Vizkelety, Proving Discrimination in
Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 36; and J. Keene, Human Rights in Ontario (Toronto: Carswell,
1992) at 6.
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point in time it was no more to be expected that a legislature could
anticipate the need to encompass effects as well as intentions than to
imagine an eighteenth-century common-law judge working with images of
typical trespass cases foreseeing the development of trespass on the case
and the opening up of negligence law it made possible.
It should be recognized that the rights and responsibilities that
constitute discrimination law are not capable of precise determination, and
laws in this area must be drafted accordingly. This approach makes sense
if we see discrimination law as an extension of the realm of non-voluntary

obligations centred in tort law. Tort law is the home of the ongoing
articulation of the general duties we owe to one another to take care for the
well-being of others.63 Historically, tort law has concentrated on the

protection of physical security and the security of property, but has also
begun to reach into the realm of pure economic interests64 and, more
slowly, emotional harm65 often grounded in a violation of dignity. The
scope of involuntary obligation has grown considerably over the last
century. Over the history of its development, an ongoing battle has been
waged to determine which obligations will be treated as truly involuntary,

and which will be subject to override through contract or treated as created
only by agreement.6 6 Through human rights statutes, the law of involuntary
63 Of course, other characterizations of tort law are also present in the literature. Some focus
on tort law's role in facilitating industrial development. See M.J. Horowitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977). Others focus more
generally on how tort doctrine responds to changing social, economic, political, and cultural changes.
See R.L. Abel, "A Critique of Torts" (1990) 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 785. In focusing on what one might
call tort law's moral function, I do not mean to deny that these other perspectives have something to
teach us. But whatever else tort law may be, it is also a system of involuntary obligations, increasingly
formulated in terms of the general duties we owe each other.
64 The courts in some jurisdictions are reaching further than others. After initiating change with
the landmark decisions inAnns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 and JuniorBooks
Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd., [1983] 1 A.C. 520, the U.K. House of Lords has cut back considerably on the
scope of recovery for pure economic loss. See e.g. Murphy v. Brentwood DistrictCouncil, [19901 2 All
E.R. 908. However, the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand courts continue cautiously to extend
obligations in this area. In the Canadian context, see Canadian National Railway v. Norsk Pacific
Steamship (1992), 91 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (S.C.C.); Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird
Construction (1995), 121 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.); and Bow Valley Husky, supra note 50.
65 This development has taken place under the rubric of the tort of intentional infliction of
nervous shock, often referred to in more recent decisions as the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See e.g. Rahemtulla v. Vanfed Credit Union, [1984] 3 W.W.R. 310 (B.C. S.C.); Canada v.
Boothman (1993), 49 C.C.E.L. 109 (Fed. T.D.); Clark v. The Queen (1994), 94 C.L.L.C. 14,028
(F.C.T.D.).
66 For an illuminating examination of the early stages of this progression, see R. L. Rabin, "The
Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation" (1981) 15 Ga. L. Rev. 925.
Although not described in precisely these terms, Rabin's account is the story of how discrete noliability pigeonholes were gradually eliminated or marginalized by the growth of a general concept of
negligence.
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obligation has been extended to offer some protection to a range of dignity
interests and the economic and social interest in employment,
accommodation, and access to services. In doing so, it has to negotiate
many of the tensions characteristic of tort law. It has long been recognized,
if there was ever any doubt, that tort law is incapable of definition.67
Instead, doctrine tends to be constructed around a sense of the human
interests at stake on each side in enjoying some form of protection, and in
being required to provide it, and the need to balance these in some way that
gives fair consideration to each. This is the general result of successive
efforts to convert the outcomes in particular cases into more general
principles purporting to explain those outcomes. It is precisely because the
interests on neither side are capable of precise articulation that the process
remains an open-ended one, with each extension of the harm from which
people should be protected being met with a re-examination of the
legitimate competing interests in the freedom to pursue legitimate ends.
If discrimination law is best seen as a statutory part of the law of
non-voluntary obligation traditionally identified with tort law, and partakes
of the same sorts of indeterminacies and the same conceptual structure, it
follows that law-making and norm development in this area should mimic
that in the area of tort. This process in tort law necessarily pursues the
bottom-up method because tort has been left to the courts to administer.
The legislature could have facilitated a similar approach in the
discrimination area by drafting the statute in open-ended terms, leaving it
up to adjudicators to work out the meaning of discrimination and the
circumstances that excuse or justify it. This would allow for the
development over time, through the reasons articulated in each case, of a
fuller theory of equality and its role in regulating human interactions. The
Ontario legislature has, instead, continued to amend the Code in piecemeal
fashion to catch up with or jump ahead of anticipated or feared doctrinal
moves by the courts so that the provisions governing "constructive"
discrimination and the BFOR defence have become increasingly byzantine.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently taken
matters into its own hands, formulating a general approach to determining
liability for discrimination that pays very little attention to the precise
wording of the various codes, but is nevertheless meant to guide
adjudication across the country. In British Columbia (P.S.E.R.C.) v.
67 For a classic attempt, fully appreciative of the impossibility of the task, see P. H. Winfield, The
Province of the Law of Tort (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931). Some see in this
indeterminacy mostly doctrinal incoherence perhaps designed to mask an ulterior agenda. See e.g.
A.C. Hutchinson & R. Maisey, "Blurred Visions: The Politics of Civil Obligations" in K. CooperStephenson and E. Gibson, eds., Tort Theory (North York: Captus Press, 1993). Where indeterminacy
is unavoidable, however, it is just as important that we be alive to the potential it gives rise to for
pushing the law in directions more conducive to human flourishing.
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BCGSEU,6 8 the Court swept away the distinction between direct and
indirect discrimination and declared that whenever an act or policy has the
effect of differentially treating an individual or individuals identified by
reference to one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination, liability will
be imposed unless the respondent can show that the standard was: 1)
adopted for a purpose rationally connected to the enterprise; 2) adopted
in good faith as necessary to the fulfillment of a legitimate purpose; and 3)
reasonably necessary to that purpose, proof of which requires a showing
that accommodation of the adversely affected individuals is impossible
without imposing undue hardship on the respondent. Thus, it seems that
the Supreme Court has realized, even if legislatures have not, that a general
set of principles under which a wide variety of fact situations can be
analyzed is the appropriate structure of discrimination law. Now what is
needed is for adjudicators throughout the system to take on the
responsibility of adding flesh and bones to the skeleton by testing it against
concrete fact situations and developing a richer account of the basis of
liability in light of such analyses.
III.

CONCLUSION

With more than fifty years of experience in dealing with
discrimination, we have, I think, outgrown the method of law-making that
consists of using the legislative machinery to enact successive new
pigeonholes each time a new kind of fact situation arises that deserves
protection. It is time for a change. The human phenomenon of
discrimination-of those in relative positions of power denying full human
status and opportunity to those in relative positions of disadvantage-is not
capable of being codified in precise terms of the sort that have
characterized past legislative efforts. In retrospect, this law-making strategy
has been as ill-conceived as if legislatures had pre-empted initial judicial
reluctance to develop the action for trespass on the case by legislating
negligence law in a similar manner. Just imagine what the law of negligence
would have looked like: first a statute imposing liability on the drivers of
horse-drawn coaches (later updated for automobiles), then another for
manufacturers of household products, then another for landlords, followed
by one for construction companies, after which one for accountants-each
specifying what counts as negligence as understood at the time, and
therefore having to be constantly updated to include new forms of
negligence in the context. Given the boundless ingenuity of the human
species in finding new ways to harm one another, this approach to
68[199913 S.C.R. 3.
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negligence would have been madness.
Entrusted with working out general principles that keep the law
relevant to the social conditions with which it must deal, the adjudicators
charged with the task in the common law courts have shown themselves
more or less up to the challenge.69 In the process and over the long run, a
practice of thinking creatively about those principles has thrived, and our
understanding of the normative foundations governing potentially harmful
interactions between people has grown. This, in turn, arguably alleviates
concerns about the courts as decision makers by making debates about
underlying values more transparent. It is time we recognize that
discrimination law is an extension of the enterprise of figuring out how
much care we each ought to take for the well-being of others. The
specificities of human interaction that might give rise to a complaint of
discrimination are as unlimited as in the context of negligence or tort more
generally and hence equally indefinable. Given the openness of the
enterprise at hand, norm creation within it requires flexibility. As Lord
Macmillan said, "The categories of negligence are never closed. ' '70 We need
a way of formulating laws in the discrimination context that will allow us to
say that the categories of discrimination are likewise never closed.
Fostering a culture of principled debate about discrimination law
may contribute to the process of more securely embedding these principles
in legal consciousness. If their interpretation, growth, and extension are
understood as part of the same process of argument and debate that
surrounds other important legal principles, instead of discrimination
liability rules being perceived as more or less arbitrary pigeonholes that
may exclude or trap, this may militate against the tendency of
constituencies inclined to resist the imposition of human rights norms to
dismiss human rights statutes as an exercise in pandering to "'special
interest groups." Without an articulated foundation in principle,
discrimination law can only ever oscillate between competing political
camps-each trying to secure the enactment of its preferred pigeonholes.
The role of egalitarian values in defining citizens' rights and obligations visA,-vis each other is too important not to try to do better.

691 do not mean to deny that there has at various times been intense controversy over particular
adaptations or refusals thereof. But such controversy is considered to be part of the process from
which the courts, like other legal participants learn.
70 Donoghue, supra note 7 at 619.

